Precedent vs. Contemporaneous Autonomy in Regard to Advance Directives Essay

Precedent vs. Contemporaneous Autonomy in Regard to Advance Directives - Essay Example Ronald Dworkin argues that if we can declare this patient incompetent, he does not have the capacity that autonomy represents. This means that respect should be upheld to the patients’ prior wishes made when competent. This is because a competent person’s decisions are autonomous ones. This view is referred to as the integrity view, which states that the value of autonomy derives from the capacity it protects: the capacity to express one’s own character traits, values, commitments, convictions and critical as well as experiential interest in a life one leads. However, it is arguable that, in most cases the present desires expressed by a patient need to be respected. Dworkin constructs a hypothetical case, where there exists a woman named Margo, who has dementia, but still seems to find pleasure in seemingly meaningless activities, such as reading, eating snacks among others. He even explains that Margo may be one of the happiest people he â€Å"knows.† How ever, years back, Margo had signed an advance directive expressing her desire to be left to die if she were to need life-saving medical treatment once afflicted with dementia. ... Dworkin believes we must respect Margo’s advance directive, as Margo living with dementia is her living against her critical interests that she held while competent. Experiential interests, in my opinion, hold a great deal of value, enough that experiential interests alone make one valuable and thus their life worth continuing. As Dworkin points out, pleasures that experiential interests provide are essential for a good life. A good life has value in it of itself, and while â€Å"genuine meaning and coherence† may enhance this value, no requirement for value to be obtained (Marshall, 123). I deduce that the reason we have critical interests are so we can enhance individual experiential ones. For instance, Dworkin claims establishing close friendships are an example of a critical interest. The reason we wish to establish such relationships is so when â€Å"watching football, or seeing Casablanca for the twelfth time or walking in the woods in October† (Marshall, 5 1) we are that much happier and life is more enjoyable. However, if one performs these experiential interests without having formed close relationships, they do not suddenly lack value; they are just perhaps slightly less enjoyable. However, if one were still to argue on critical interests that hold true value, we can see in many instances where experiential interests remain valuable on their own. The existence of a person who is solely able to attain experiential interests may allow someone else to enhance his or her critical interests. For example, in the case of Margo, there existed a medical student, Firlik, who took a specific interest in her case (Marshall, 144). By being able to visit Margo daily, Firlik was able to answer his questions and